Michigan Law Review
Volume 44

Issue 6

1946

CORPORATIONS --VOTING TRUSTS -- NON-COMPLIANCE WITH
STATUTE AS A BASIS FOR JUDICIAL TERMINATION
Joseph R. Brookshire S.Ed.
University of Michigan Law School

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr
Part of the Business Organizations Law Commons, and the Common Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Joseph R. Brookshire S.Ed., CORPORATIONS --VOTING TRUSTS -- NON-COMPLIANCE WITH STATUTE AS
A BASIS FOR JUDICIAL TERMINATION, 44 MICH. L. REV. 1048 (1946).
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol44/iss6/9

This Response or Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of
Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an
authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please
contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu.

MICHIGAN LAw R.Evrnw

[ Vol. 44.

CORPORATIONS -VOTING TRUSTS - NON-COMPLIANCE WITH
STATUTE As A BAsis FOR JUDICIAL TERMINATION-It is not th~ purpose of this comment to discuss the history of the voting trust, to re-
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capitulate the controversy over its legality,1 or to examine the many
grounds for termination of the trust. 2 It is sufficient to say that in all
but perhaps three states this important business device has been made
legal by statute or by judicial decision.8 We are here concerned with
finding the degree of statutory compliance necessary in order that the
voting trust will be sustained.
In a leading case, Matter of Morse, the court laid down this widely
quoted principle of law: "Whether they ( voting trusts) would be valid
at common law in the absence of a statute defining and regulating them
is immaterial .... No voting trust not within the terms of the statute is
legal and any such trust, so long ~s its purpose is legitimate, coming
within its terms is legal. The test of validity is the rule of the statute.
When the field was occupied by the Legislature it was fully occupied
and no place was left for other voting trusts." 4 ·
Strangely enough, however, there are but few cases wherein this
principle was cited in an attack upon the validity of a partjcular voting
trust. In a recent Michigan case,5 a voting trust, irrevocable for ten
years, was formed in October of I939· The voting trustees voted the
stock assigned them in a stockholders' meeting held in December of that
year for the election of directors. These direc;tors then elected officers
of the corporation, and not until I 940 was a certificate for the stock in
the trust issued in the trustees' names. After the voting trust had been
in existence for several years, a minority in interest of the participants
of the trust brought suit for termination on the ground, among others
not important to this comment, that the trust was invalid under the
Michigan statute. 6 The statutory provision violated was the one re1 See 5 FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA CoRPORATIONs, perm. ed., § 2078 (1931);
Burke, "Voting Trus!s Currently Observed," 24 MINN. L. REv. 347 (1940);
Wormser, "The Legality of Corporate Voting Trusts and Pooling Agreements," 18
CoL. L. REv. 123 (1918).
2 If formed for a fraudulent purpose, Venner v. Chicago City Ry. Co., 258 Ill.
523, IOI N.E. 949 (1913). To perpetuate control, Lebus v. Stansifer, 154 Ky. 444,
157 S.W. 727 (1913). Restraint upon alienation, Moses v. Scott, 84 Ala. 608, 4 S.
742 (1887).
8 Dougherty and Berry, "The Voting Trust-Its Present Status," 28 GEo. L. J.
Il2I (1940).
4 247 N.Y. 290 at 298, 160 N.E. 374 (1928).
5 Herman v. Dereszewski, 312 Mich. 244, 20 N.W. (2d) 176 (1945).
6 Michigan General Corporation Act, § 34, Mich. Consol. L. (Mason, Supp.
1940) § 10135-34. The pertinent terms are: "After filing an unexecuted copy of
such agreement in the registered office of the corporation in this state, which copy shall
be open to the inspection of any shareholder of the corporation or any depositor under
said agreement daily during business hours, the certificates for shares so transferred shall
be surrendered and cancelled, and new certificates therefor shall be issued to such
transferee or transferees, who may be designated voting trustees, and in the entry of
such transferee or transferees as owners of such shares in the proper books of the issuing
corporation that fact shall be noted, and thereupon said transferee or transferees may
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quiring that the certificates of stock be issued to the trustees before they
are allowed to vote the shares of stock covered by the voting trust
agreement. The court held that "there was substantial compliance with
the statute in the execution of the agreement and the issuance of stock
to the voting trustees," 7 and therefore the agreement was valid.
We can derive no assistance from' the writers in our search for the
solution to our problem, for their statements that strict statutory compliance is necessary are based upon the Morse case,8 and that case does
nothing to dispel the confusion. The distinction between mandatory
and directory provisions in a voting trust statute was not involved in the
case; it was concerned with the· basis for voting trusts, for the statutory
authorization of voting trusts had been withdrawn from banking corporations by amendment to the statute. We find the statement that
"statutes authorizing the creation of a voting trust agreement have been
held to be mandatory, so that unless the agreement is executed in conformity with the regulations prescribed, the trust is void, irrespective of
what the common law rule might have been in the particular jurisdic.:..
tion." 9 Of the three cases cited as authority for this statement only two
have any bearing upon our problem. One of the two also leaves the
cloud upon our picture, for therein it is said that a trust not complying
with the statutory provisions is invalid; but there is no disclosure of
what provision was not complied with, the issue was not pressed, and
there were other grounds for holding the trust invalid. 10 The remaining one cites the Morse case in holding that a voting trust which violates
the statutory limitation on duration is completely void. 11 Thus we
may be satisfied that such a provision is mandatory, but we see that a
difference of opinion exists as to the results of a violation of such a
limitation. In the same state which gave birth to the Morse case it was
held that the trust was not invalidated by such a violation, but rather
only the portion beyond the statutory duration was invalidated.12 In
'

,

vote upon the shares so transferred during the period in such agreement specified and
thereafter until those entitled to receive certificates of stock under such agreement shall
have received the same."
7 312 Mich. 244 at 248, 20 N.W. (2d) 176 (1945).
8 5 FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA CoRPORATIONS, perm. ed.,§ 2080 at p. 285 (1931);
33 MrcH. L. REv. 804 (1935); Burke, "Voting Trusts Currently Observed," 24
MINN. L. REv. 347 at 361 (1940)·; 105 A.L.R. 123 at 146 (1936).
9 18 C.J.S. 1261.
10 Davidson v. American Paper Manufacturing Co., 188 La. 69, 175 S. 753
(1937). The discarded member of the trio actually displayed a liberal attitude toward
voting trusts in holding that a trustee may delegate his votes to another trustee where
the terms of the agreement permit it, Chandler v. Bellanca Aircraft Corp., 19 Dela.
Ch. 57, 162 A. 63 (1932).
11 Perry v. Missouri-Kansas Pipe Line Co., 22 Dela. Ch. 33, 191 A. 823 (1937).
12 Kittinger v. Churchill Evangelistic Assn., 151 Misc. 350, 271 N.Y.S. 510
(1934).
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holding that the entire trust fails, the Delaware court said that the
"provisions of our statute governing voting trusts are mandatory"; 18
but in a recent case, the Delaware court upheld an injunction to force a
trustee to exchange stock, "although for a considerable part of the term
of the trust neither of the voting trustees attempted to obtain a record
transfer of the stock assigned to them ...." 14 In a later hearing of the
same case, the court sustained the demand of the holders of a minority
in interest of the trust that the other holders transfer their stock to the
defendant corporation, and that the corporation reissue to the stockholders new certificates in the name of the voting trustees, "although
for more than two years after the execution of the agreement no attempt was made to comply with the statutory provisions concerning the
filing of a copy of the agreement and the issuance of-stock certificates in
the names of the voting trustees ...." 15
In the Michigan case the issue as to whether substantial compliance
with the statute is sufficient was squarely before the court, and the trust
was upheld. This decision gains significance when we realize that it was
rendered in a jurisdiction which, prior to the enactment of the statute,
apparently could find no common law basis for upholding voting
trusts. 10 Although the report of the Delaware case does not disclose
that the court dealt specifically with the question, there, too, the trustees
had elected the directors of the corporation before the statutory requirements were fulfilled, and it was made apparent that strict compliance with statutory provisions is not necessary. Again we find that
this result was reached in a jurisdiction which found it necessary to rely
upon a statute in order to sustain voting trusts, rather than attempt to
find any basis for them at common law.17 In those states which upheld
voting trusts before legislation was passed supporting them, the principle anounced in Matter of Morse should cause little difficulty.
At the present time, the broad statement that provisions in a voting
trust statute are mandatory appears to be disapproved by the courts.
We may agree that limitations on duration, rights of trustees, control
and voting rights are mandatory. But the Michigan case demonstrates
the relaxation by modern courts of the strict compliance principle voiced
in Matter of Morse, and indicates a realization that the voting trust is a
valuable business device which should not be condemned without a
hearing. 18 A recent decision of the New York court indicates a change
18

Perry v. Missouri-Kansas Pipe Line Co., 22 Dela. Ch. 33, 191 A. 823 (1937).
Hirschwald v. Erlebacher, (Dela. Ch. 1943) 29 A. (2d) 798 at 801.
15
Id., 33 A. (2d) 148 at 154 (1943), affirmed per curiam, (Dela. 1944) 36 A.
(2d) 167.
16
Billings v. Marshall Furnace Co., 210 Mich. 1, 177 N.W. 222 (1920).
17
Chandler v. Bellanca Aircraft Corp., 19 Dela. Ch. 57, 162 A. 63 (1932).
18
Gose, "Legal Characteristics and Consequences of Voting Trusts," 20 WASH.
L. REv. 129 (1945).
H
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in attitude toward statutory voting tq1sts; in Wolf v. Roosevelt 19 the
court held tnat a statute limiting the duration of voting trusts to five
years does not limit a ten year trust formed prior to the statute. In
voicing their dissent, the minority of the court heavily relied upon
Matter of M9rse. While it is true that the voting trust may lend itself
to dishonest purposes, 20 the same can be said concerning other devices
invented to supplement the. corporate structure. An intelligent super. vision by the courts, and a realistic approach by the legislature will do
much toward eliminating the vices of the voting trust, and yet save
its desirable features. The recognition of the voting trust is now almost
universal, and should carry as a necessary corollary the abandonment of
the strict con&truction theory.
Joseph R. Brookshire, S.Ed.

19 290 N.Y. 400, 49 N.E. (2d) 502 (1943). See also Mannheimer v. Keehn,
41 N.Y.S. (2d) 542 (1943), wherein the voting trust law of New York was examined,
and it was said that voting trusts in New York are pri11_1a facie valid, and not p~esumed
void until the contrary appears.
.
20 Ballantine, "Voting Trusts, Their- Abuses and Regulation," 21 TEXAS L. REV.
139 (1942).
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